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a b s t r a c t
In this paper we combine two traditions in the analysis of ﬁrms’ location patterns. One led by trade econ-
omists who try to understand why do ﬁrms invest abroad, and another one led by urban/regional econ-
omists, who frequently use patterns of inter-regional or inter-city choices to estimate agglomeration
economies. We contribute to the trade-motivated set of papers on location choices by adding the domes-
tic country in the choice set, while accounting for ﬁrm’s heterogeneity in the choices. Our econometric
results using French ﬁrm-level data show an important ‘‘home bias” in manufacturing investment deci-
sions. A crucial ﬁnding, which bridges with our contribution to the agglomeration literature, is that the
spatial clustering of afﬁliates belonging to the same industrial group accounts for the lion’s share of this
home bias.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Location choices by multinational ﬁrms have been studied by
mostly two groups of researchers, who generally put the emphasis
on different aspects of those decisions. Trade economists – the ﬁrst
group – usually focus their attention on determinants of invest-
ments abroad.1 By contrast, urban/regional economists often use
patterns of inter-regional or inter-city choices to estimate agglomer-
ation economies.2 In this paper, we try to bridge those two litera-
tures and we also propose contributions to both. In a nutshell, our
paper adds to the trade-motivated literature by taking into account
domestic investments and identifying a ‘‘home bias” in location
choices. Our contribution to the agglomeration literature is to con-
sider the spatial clustering of ﬁrms belonging to the same industrial
group as a determinant of location choices, and to show that it ac-
counts for a large part of the estimated home bias.
The interest for decisions by multinational ﬁrms regarding
where they locate their manufacturing plants is of course not con-
ﬁned to academia. The extent, determinants and effects of outward
investment is a topic of great public interest, in particular in devel-
oped countries. While continental Europe is primarily concerned
with the possible disappearance of its manufacturing base, the
United States and the United Kingdom pay more attention to the
offshoring of services. These fears can lead to drastic policy
changes. For instance, a survey conducted by Eurobarometer
(2005) suggests that the fear of offshoring was the primary reason
invoked by the French for rejecting the European Constitutional
Treaty in May 2005.3 Behind this fear is the feeling that Foreign Di-
rect Investment (FDI) will substitute for domestic investment, which
may partly be behind these countries’ low employment rates.
In this paper, we try to address this question by comparing the
determinants of domestic and foreign investment. Our intuition is
that FDI will be more likely to reduce domestic investment if it al-
lows the ﬁrm to serve the same markets at a lower cost. Using
ﬁrm-level data on French investments, both in France and abroad,
over the 1992–2002 period, we investigate the determinants of
location choice, and empirically assess whether (and why) the
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1 The typical set of questions asked by trade economists relate to whether
corporate taxation (Devereux and Grifﬁth, 1998), labour costs (Liu et al., 2010),
environmental regulation (Dean et al., 2009), cohesion policy (Basile et al., 2008), and
all sorts of variables typically affected by nation-level public policies, matter in
location patterns (although they sometimes use sub-national datasets to identify
those effects).
2 Guimarães et al. (2000), Crozet et al. (2004), Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009), and
Spies (2010) are examples of a large set of papers using ﬁrm-level location choice data
and logit econometric modeling to estimate the extent of clustering behavior at the
sub-national level.
3 Even though the actual relationship between the treaty and offshoring is fairly
unclear.
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domestic economy has become less attractive over recent years, as
is often claimed in the public debate over offshoring in rich
countries.
With respect to previous ﬁrm-level analysis of FDI decisions,
our value-added is the use of data covering both domestic plant
creations and investments in a large number of foreign countries,
which makes it possible to investigate the decision to invest
abroad rather than in France, and the location choice, conditional
on having decided to carry out this investment abroad. Previous
work has typically focused on only one aspect of this decision pro-
cess: the choice between exporting and FDI in Brainard (1997) and
Head and Ries (2003) for instance, or conditional location choice in,
amongst many others, Coughlin et al. (1991), Head et al. (1999),
Guimarães et al. (2000) and Head and Mayer (2004). One notable
exception is Devereux and Grifﬁth (1998), who model US ﬁrms’
strategies in European markets as a sequential process involving
(i) the choice of serving the European market, (ii) the trade-off be-
tween exporting from the USA or investing in Europe, and (iii) the
choice of a speciﬁc European country, conditional on having
decided to invest in Europe.
Our work is close to theirs in spirit, although our data cover a
much larger set of foreign locations. Moreover, we add a number
of determinants of ﬁrms’ choices, suggested by a more explicit the-
oretical model. More speciﬁcally, we use a model that builds on
Head and Mayer (2004) and Amiti and Javorcik (2008) to derive
the determinants of location choices from a New Economic Geog-
raphy (NEG) perspective. We also integrate results by Helpman
et al. (2004) and Markusen (2002) in this framework to explain
the choice between domestic and foreign investments. In that re-
spect, our model shares some similarities with Chen and Moore
(2010).
In our data, more than 80% of investments involve the creation
of an afﬁliate in France, which strongly suggests the existence of a
‘‘home bias” in location choices. While the extent of this home bias
tends to decrease over time, it is still very large at the end of the
period. We try to explain it by standard, country-level determinants
of location choices. These variables do explain a substantial part of
why French investors continue to invest (so much) in France. How-
ever, we also show that the main drivers of the home bias have to
be found in ﬁrm-level determinants. In particular, larger and more
productive ﬁrms are more likely to engage in FDI.
Finally, our data allow us to account for the worldwide geo-
graphical structure of the ﬁrm. We build a ﬁrm-level network var-
iable describing the strength of ﬁnancial linkages that a given
investor has in each country (including France) due to previous
investments there. This turns out to be an important determinant
of subsequent location decisions, and also a key factor in explain-
ing the choice between investment at home and abroad. Our re-
sults suggest that French ﬁrms over-invest in France because
they can beneﬁt from agglomeration externalities from afﬁliates
already installed there. In this respect, our paper is also related
to the urban economics literature measuring the extent of agglom-
eration economies. It has been shown that the spatial agglomera-
tion of economic activity improves total factor productivity
(Henderson, 2003; Cingano and Schivardi, 2004, being recent
examples) and other economic variables like employment growth
in Brülhart and Sbergami (2009), wages in Combes et al. (2008)
or export decisions in Koenig (2009). The classical distinction in
that literature is between urbanization economieswhere the overall
density of economic activity is beneﬁcial, and localization econo-
mies where what matters is within-industry agglomeration. Many
papers ﬁnd stronger evidence in favor of localization economies
(see, among others, Henderson, 2003). Within-industry agglomer-
ation economies have also been shown to matter in the spatial dis-
tribution of FDI, Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) or Spies (2010)
being recent examples. We go one step further and ask whether
agglomeration beneﬁts are also at play within-ﬁrm. This turns out
to be a crucial determinant of location choices, explaining the lion’s
share of the home bias in investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides our theoretical motivation, mostly combining New Eco-
nomic Geography determinants of location with ﬁrm-speciﬁc
explanations of the FDI decision. Section 3 presents the data used
and a descriptive analysis of the proposed determinants of location
choice. Section 4 contains the results of our location choice esti-
mates for investment abroad, which enables comparison with
those in previous work, and Section 5 adds domestic investment.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Theory and empirical implementation
2.1. Assumptions
Our theoretical framework builds on Head and Mayer (2004)
and Amiti and Javorcik (2008). Those papers describe the expected
proﬁts of an afﬁliate in each of the prospective locations to predict
the equilibrium number of afﬁliates in each country (Amiti and
Javorcik, 2008) or the probability that a ﬁrm invests in a given loca-
tion (Head and Mayer, 2004). Our innovation is to integrate results
by Helpman et al. (2004) and Markusen (2002) in this framework,
in order to also explain the choice between domestic and foreign
investments. In that respect, our model shares some similarities
with Chen and Moore (2010). We however depart from this paper
on two major assumptions, detailed below.
Our partial equilibrium model studies the decision for a ﬁrm
producing a differentiated good to open a new production unit,
either in its own country or abroad.4 In this context, the arbitrage
between alternative locations is explained by the relative attributes
of each location. Individual decisions are also sensitive to the ﬁrm’s
productivity, that determines its proﬁtability in each location. As in
Helpman et al. (2004), the ﬁxed cost for producing is supposed high-
er for investing abroad than for producing domestically. This
hypothesis accounts for the fact that information on a country is eas-
ier to gather when the ﬁrm is located there, which reduces the ﬁxed
cost of creating a new afﬁliate.5
The production technology is as follows. Each ﬁrm f is endowed
with a productivity h(f), drawn from a common distribution G(h).6,7
To create a new plant, ﬁrms bear a ﬁxed cost, expressed in unit of the
numeraire good. Entering the domestic market is less costly than
investing in a foreign country: Ffdi > Fdom. As in Head and Mayer
(2004) and Amiti and Javorcik (2008), but contrary to Chen and
4 Helpman et al. (2004) consider the ex-ante decision for a ﬁrm to enter the
domestic market and, conditional on entry, the decision to serve foreign markets
through exporting or FDI. We depart from them and analyze how ﬁrms decide where
to locate a new production unit, conditional on having decided to create a plant. On
the other hand, we are silent on the reason why the ﬁrm decides to create the plant.
We have in mind a ﬁrm that develops a new product which it will produce itself, and
that has to be produced in a new facility (because of capacity constraints or of totally
different production process). Our focus on the conditional location decision is
dictated by the data we use: our sample only contains information on ﬁrms that
already produce in France and decide to invest in a new plant, either in France or
abroad.
5 Helpman et al. (2004) also mention plant-level returns to scale associated with
the choice of producing domestically rather than abroad. Here, the extra ﬁxed cost for
investing abroad cannot be rationalized in that way as the location decision is
conditional on the ﬁrm opening a new plant.
6 Because we focus on location decisions at the ﬁrm level, we do not have to specify
G( ) here.
7 In the following, we assume that the new plant inherits the productivity of the
investing ﬁrm. This assumption is dictated by the data availability, as we have no
information about the ex-post productivity of the plant. We could also argue that
ﬁrms may invest in a particular country to increase their productivity. We however
expect this motive to be picked up by our measures of the host country’s factor costs,
notably its GDP per capita.
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Moore (2010), we assume the ﬁxed cost does not depend upon the
foreign location chosen: Fj = Ffdi," j 2 fdi. As shown latter on, this
assumption is useful when it comes to derive a theoretically-consis-
tent equation to estimate the conditional location choice for invest-
ments abroad.
Once the ﬁxed cost is paid, the ﬁrm can produce and sell goods
through its new plant. The marginal cost is conditional on its loca-
tion strategy. A ﬁrm f that has invested in country i (which can be
either the domestic country or a foreign one) incurs the following
cost:
Ciðf Þ ¼ v iðf Þiðf Þhðf Þ
where vi(f)i(f) reﬂects the cost of inputs incorporated in production.
The i(f) component of costs is unobservable andwill be the source of
the residual term in our estimated equation. InHelpman et al. (2004),
the vi(f) component is equal to the wage level in country i, wi. In our
setting, vi(f) also depends on the price of the intermediates that the
afﬁliate uses in production, which we measure in the empirics with
a supply access variable summarizing the expected supply of domes-
tically produced intermediate goods that the afﬁliate is able to buy
from country i. As explained in Section 3, and following Amiti and
Javorcik (2008), the computation of the supply access variable takes
into account both the technology used by ﬁrm f (which inﬂuences its
afﬁliate’s input use) and the availability of inputs in country i.
Finally, we also allow vi(f) to reﬂect various transaction costs, la-
beled TCi(f). This captures the fact that it is probably easier for a
French investor to run a business in a proximate, francophone or
ex-colonial country.8 Those advantages are identical for all French
investors, but theremight be some ﬁrm-speciﬁc information/transac-
tion-cost differences across countries in vi(f). In particular, a ﬁrm
investing inanareawhere a largenumberof otherﬁrms fromthe same
industrial grouphave already investedwill probably beneﬁt from low-
er costs there, all else equal. We construct a ﬁrm-level network vari-
able to account for this type of effect. This closes our assumptions on
costs.
We can now turn to proﬁts earned through different strategies,
which requires specifying sales of the afﬁliates under different sce-
narios. In our model, production of the new afﬁliate can both be
sold locally and in third countries.9 Exporting however induces ex-
tra costs, which we model using a iceberg cost sij. Given a classical
CES utility function, the sales on market j by ﬁrm f’s afﬁliate located
in country i are given by:
xijðf Þ ¼ Aj½sijpiðf Þ1r
where r is the constant elasticity of substitution, Aj is the ‘‘real” de-
mand level in country j10 and pi(f) is the FOB price of the ﬁrm, equal
to a ﬁxed mark-up over Ci(f) under mill-pricing ðpiðf Þ ¼ rr1Ciðf ÞÞ.
Incorporating demand functions and optimal prices into the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt allows to compare proﬁts expected from different
location strategies. If ﬁrm f decides to establish its afﬁliate in its
own country, it will serve all locations from this plant, and its prof-
its will therefore sum over proﬁts made in each j destination
country:
pdomðf Þ ¼
X
j
xdomjðf Þ
r
 Fdom ¼ 1rp
1r
domðf ÞMAdom  Fdom:
In this expression, MAdom 
P
j/domjAj is the ‘‘market access” ﬁrm f
can expect from an afﬁliate located in its own country, and
/domj  s1rdomj measures the ‘‘free-ness” of trade between the domes-
tic country and market j. Redding and Venables (2004) show how to
estimate a theory-consistent version of this variable using bilateral
trade data. This is the method used in a location choice context by
Head and Mayer (2004), and which we also use later in this paper.
Firm f may also choose to locate its afﬁliate abroad. If the new
plant is located in country i– dom, proﬁts are given by:
piðf Þ ¼
X
j
xijðf Þ
r
 Ffdi ¼ 1rp
1r
i ðf ÞMAi  Ffdi:
Proﬁts then depend on the market access of country i:
MAi 
P
j/ijAj, where freeness of trade is deﬁned as above (estima-
tion method will be the same as for MAdom naturally).
2.2. Location decisions
Given our assumptions, a ﬁrm’s strategy can be decomposed
into two decisions. First, the ﬁrm decides whether to invest domes-
tically or abroad. Second, if it has decided to do FDI in the ﬁrst step,
its picks up a foreign location. In the following, it is assumed that,
at each stage of the decision process, ﬁrm f chooses the strategy
that maximizes expected proﬁts. Consider the second stage: the
probability that ﬁrm f chooses country i within the set of foreign
locations can be written as:
Pijfdiðf Þ ¼ Pfpiðf Þ > pjðf Þ; 8 i– j 2 fdig
¼ Pfpiðf Þ1rMAi > pjðf Þ1rMAj; 8 i– j 2 fdig
¼ P ejðf Þ  eiðf Þ < ð1 rÞ lnv iðf Þv jðf Þ þ ln
MAi
MAj
; 8 i– j 2 fdi
 
ð1Þ
where ei(f)  (1  r)lni(f), is a measure of unobserved cost advan-
tage of country i for ﬁrm f (recall that i(f) is pushing costs upwards
for f in i, but that r > 1). The interpretation is then fairly straightfor-
ward: on the RHS of this expression are the observed advantages of
location i: relatively high market access and low costs. On the LHS,
we ﬁnd the unobserved relative attractiveness of country j. If the
latter is smaller than the former, ﬁrms choose i rather than j. The
precise functional form taken by this probability depends naturally
on the distribution of e that is assumed. We will turn to this issue in
the next subsection.
Under our assumptions, Eq. (1) makes it clear that the produc-
tivity of the decision maker (h(f)) does not enter the choice of a for-
eign location, conditional on the ﬁrm doing FDI. This distinguishes
our model from Chen and Moore (2010) and crucially comes from
two assumptions. First, the productivity of the afﬁliate has to be
homogeneous across locations. The assumption is standard in the
literature estimating determinants of location choices. Its justiﬁca-
tion is mainly practical: assuming the productivity to be location-
speciﬁc would yield predictions that are impossible to test without
information about the ex-post productivity of the plant. The sec-
ond crucial assumption that indeed explains why we do not obtain
the same predictions as Chen and Moore (2010) is that the ﬁxed
cost is homogeneous across foreign locations.11 In our theoretical
8 These transaction costs might also take the form of ﬁxed costs. Since their effect is
statistically signiﬁcant in the regressions, it however seems that at least part of their
inﬂuence on location decisions operates through the ﬁrm’s marginal cost.
9 This distinguishes us from Chen and Moore (2010). Their model considers the
creation of a foreign plant is only designed to serve the local market. Proﬁts generated
by FDI in each market are thus compared with proﬁts the ﬁrm would obtain by
exporting from its domestic production unit to this same market. We therefore allow
for a richer geographical structure of sales by afﬁliates, while they allow for a richer
structure of ﬁxed costs over space.
10 In this Dixit–Stiglitz–Krugman setup, Aj  EjP1rj , where Ej is total expenditure on
the good in question in j, and Pj is the CES price index in the same country on the same
good (it is also an inverse measure of competition on this market).
11 Would we assume the ﬁxed cost to be market-speciﬁc (Fi – Fj, i 2 fdi&j 2 fdi), we
would obtain that the probability of ﬁrm f to invest in country i is equal to the
probability that: hðf Þ > r1r 
FiFj
ðv i ðf Þiðf ÞÞ1rMAiðv j ðf Þj ðf ÞÞ1rMAj
  1
r1
; 8 j – i 2 fdi. This con-
dition cannot be directly brought to data through log-linearization, which explains
why we did not choose this speciﬁcation.
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framework, the choice of a location conditional on the ﬁrm doing FDI
is thus a function of the countries’ relative access to relevant markets
in terms of demand and their relative (observed and unobserved)
production costs.
Consider now the decision for the ﬁrm to invest domestically or
abroad. In our model, the probability that ﬁrm f holds FDI is the
probability that its proﬁt abroad is higher than the proﬁt derived
from a domestic plant:
Pfdiðf Þ ¼ Pfpi ðf Þ > pdomðf Þg
¼ P hðf Þ > rðFfdi  FdomÞ
½v i ðf Þi ðf Þ1rMAi  ½vdomðf Þdomðf Þ1rMAdom
" # 1
r1
8<:
9=;
¼ Pfðr 1Þ ln hðf Þ > lnrþ lnðFfdi  FdomÞ  lnDpopðf Þg ð2Þ
where i* is the foreign location that maximizes (foreign) proﬁts (i.e.
the location chosen in the second stage described above), and
Dpopðf Þ  v i ðf Þi ðf Þ½ 1rMAi  vdomðf Þdomðf Þ½ 1rMAdom
is the extra operational proﬁt ﬁrm f obtains when producing abroad
rather than in France. As in Helpman et al. (2004), we observe in (2)
that the more productive ﬁrms (high h(f)) are more likely to pay the
higher ﬁxed cost of doing FDI (Ffdi  Fdom). This is more likely when
the extra operational proﬁt (Dpop(f)) this strategy induces is high.
The next subsection explains how we approximate the later
determinant.
At a given productivity, the probability that a ﬁrm invests
abroad is decreasing in the extra ﬁxed cost it involves. To approx-
imate this extra ﬁxed cost, we use an argument found in the liter-
ature that explains the choice of investing abroad by the need to
protect ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets under contractual incompleteness
(Horstmann and Markusen (1987) is a very early contribution in
a literature that has recently grown very fast. See Antràs (2003)
or Antràs and Helpman (2004) for recent contributions). When
the ﬁrm’s value-added relies on intangible assets like its reputation
or brand name, the ﬁrm has an incentive to invest in a foreign plant
to maintain the ﬁrm’s stock of goodwill. This means that intangible
assets should raise the perceived ﬁxed cost of investing domesti-
cally (i.e. reduce FFDI  Fdom) and increase the ﬁrm’s propensity to
invest abroad. To approximate these intangible assets, we use the
ratio of advertising expenditures to value-added.
2.3. Empirical implementation
The two-stage discrete choice model just described can be very
naturally estimated using a nested logit (Train, 2003, Chapter 4, is a
recent and very complete synthesis of those methods). In compar-
ison with a standard conditional logit estimator, this method ac-
counts for the possibility that substitution patterns are not the
same across all alternatives. It therefore partitions the set of alter-
natives into several ‘‘nests” and assumes nest-speciﬁc substitution
patterns across alternatives. In our framework, there are two nests:
either the investing ﬁrm creates an afﬁliate within its own country
(the ‘‘dom” nest) or it locates its afﬁliate abroad (the ‘‘fdi” nest).
Under this nested tree structure, location choice is decomposed
into two steps, the choice of a nest (i.e. investing domestically or
abroad) and the choice of a location within the chosen nest.
The probability that country i be chosen as a location can then
be expressed as the product of two probabilities: the probability
Pkðf Þ that nest k = {dom;fdi} containing i is chosen (also called
the upper model), and the conditional probability Pijkðf Þ that loca-
tion i be chosen among the potential locations in the chosen nest
(the bottom model):
Piðf Þ ¼ Pijkðf ÞPkðf Þ ð3Þ
The determinants of each of these probabilities in our model are
described by Eqs. (1) and (2). In each of those equations, if the
unobserved component of proﬁts (ei(f)) follows a Generalized Ex-
treme Value (GEV) distribution, McFadden (1978) has shown that
each of those probabilities can be expressed as:
Pkðf Þ ¼ exp Wkðf Þ þ qkIVkðf Þ fIV ðf Þh i ð4Þ
Pijkðf Þ ¼ exp Yiðf Þ=qk  IVkðf Þ½  ð5Þ
where Yi(f) is a vector of market-speciﬁc determinants impacting
where the ﬁrm locates, conditional on its having chosen a nest.
From (1), these determinants are the market access of each location
(MAi) and the magnitude of production costs (vi(f)).Wk(f) is a vector
of nest-speciﬁc determinants explaining the choice between a
domestic and a foreign location. From (2), these are related to the
magnitude of the extra ﬁxed cost of investing abroad. The parame-
ter qk is the ‘‘log-sum coefﬁcient” that is inversely related to the
correlation of unobserved factors within each nest. Its estimation
indicates the relevance of the assumed tree structure.12 The expres-
sion IVkðf Þ  ln
P
j2k exp½Yjðf Þ=qk is the ‘‘inclusive value” of nest k,
and qkIVk(f) is the expected proﬁt that ﬁrm f receives from the choice
of a location in nest k (see Train, 2003, p. 87). Its introduction into
the upper model brings in information from the bottom model,
reﬂecting that the choice of a nest depends on the expected proﬁt re-
ceived from all of the locations in that nest.13 It thus captures the
Dpop(f) term of Eq. (2).14 Last, fIV ðf Þ  lnPk exp½Wkðf Þ þ qkIVkðf Þ
summarizes the proﬁt expected from the two nests, which are here
France (‘‘dom”) and abroad (‘‘fdi”). This term acts as the denominator
in the choice probability Pkðf Þ.
The model can be estimated by maximum likelihood techniques
using information on the variables entering the proﬁt function. In
the following, we adopt a backward estimation procedure15: we
ﬁrst estimate the bottom model using information contained in
Yi(f), and then compute the inclusive value of each nest that is intro-
duced with the variables entering Wk(f) in the estimation of the
upper model. We also carry out estimations of the bottom model
on the full sample of investments, including domestic investments.
Adding a ‘‘France” dummy, we can then assess whether there is
something speciﬁc about domestic investments which justiﬁes the
use of a nested tree.
3. Data
3.1. The dependent variable: investments abroad and at home
Our dependent variable consists of investments by French ﬁrms
in production afﬁliates located abroad or in France. We use several
ﬁrm-level datasets which provide us with information on these
two types of investments. We focus on manufacturing industries,
both because the type of theory available to study FDI is better sui-
ted to manufacturing, and because the availability and quality of
data on afﬁliates abroad is far better for manufacturing. There
are essentially two types of information required: the characteris-
tics of ﬁrms engaging in domestic or foreign investments, and the
location of the investments abroad in the latter case.
12 A parameter qk = 1 indicates the absence of correlation in unobserved factors
within each nest. In that case, the nested model reduces to a standard logit.
13 Note that in the particular case we are considering, one of the nests constitutes a
single location: France. The inclusive value is then: IVdom(f) = Ydom(f)/qdom and it is no
longer possible to identify separately the ‘‘log-sum” coefﬁcient qdom. In the following,
we thus constrain both log-sum coefﬁcients to be equal and estimate their value
using the variability of Yi(f) within the nest of foreign locations.
14 See Anderson et al. (1992) and Train (2003) for a derivation of the expected
utility/proﬁt in the logit model: it is in our case the proﬁt expected from investing in
the best foreign location (as in Dpop(f)). When the error term is distributed extreme
value, this expected utility is equal to qkIVk(f) (up to a constant term).
15 This produces consistent (though not efﬁcient) estimates of the parameters: see
Train (2003).
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Information on the characteristics of ﬁrms creating new afﬁli-
ates abroad or at home comes from a survey called the EAE (‘‘En-
quête Annuelle d’Entreprise”) available to us over the 1985–2002
period. This is an annual survey of all French ﬁrms with more than
20 employees, with information such as employment, value added,
intermediate consumption, and wages. Critically, this source also
allows us to detect the creation of new establishments in France.
The variable we use is that indicating the number of the ﬁrm’s pro-
duction establishments. We count as a location choice in France,
every increase in the number of the ﬁrm’s production establish-
ments over a ﬁscal year.16 Note that our procedure conditions loca-
tion choice in France on the fact that the ﬁrm already exists and has
production establishments previous to the location choice, i.e. we do
not consider births of ﬁrms to be location choices in France, in order
to have the most comparable set of ﬁrms possible (large and ﬁrmly-
established ﬁrms). This procedure yields 19,309 establishment cre-
ations in France over the 1985–2002 period, with 13,342 between
1992 and 2002, which latter will be the focus of our estimation.
We also present results restricting the sample to ﬁrms belonging
to ﬁnancial groups that have invested abroad at some point in our
time frame, i.e. ﬁrms belonging to multinational companies (MNC).
This drastically reduces the number of domestic investments to
2244 over the 1992–2002 period.
The data used to identify location choices of foreign afﬁliates
come from two sources. First we use an annual survey called ‘‘LiFi”,
conducted by the French statistical institute. This focuses on the
ﬁnancial links between ﬁrms. The ﬁrms which are interviewed
here have assets of at least 1.2 million Euros. These ﬁrms are asked
about their ﬁnancial interest in other establishments both in
France and abroad. In 2002 for instance, the survey provides infor-
mation on 193,895 manufacturing establishments. For each of
those establishments, the following information is available: the
‘‘head” ﬁrm identiﬁcation number (the ﬁnal shareholder); the loca-
tion (address plus a country code); the industry; the share held by
the head in the afﬁliate; ‘‘the rank” of the afﬁliate, deﬁned as the
number of ﬁrms between the ‘‘head” and the afﬁliate; and the year
of investment. LiFi data is available from 1986 to 2002.
We complete this data from a second source. The General Direc-
tion for Economic Policy in the French Ministry of Finance (DGTPE)
provides independently-collected information on French ﬁrms’
afﬁliates abroad (mostly based on surveys by French embassies
abroad). For each afﬁliate, this database lists the country of resi-
dence, the industry, the year of investment, and other information
such as employment and, sometimes, sales. Each of these foreign
afﬁliates has been given an identiﬁer and the French national sta-
tistical institute has identiﬁed the head ofﬁce in France. Some of
these afﬁliates (and associated heads) are common to the two
sources, but the DGTPE data does provide some additional infor-
mation. These two sources together provide information on 4081
manufacturing foreign afﬁliates linked to a French MNC since
1970. Of these location decisions, 3036 were taken in the 1992–
2002 period. We only keep foreign afﬁliates that are still in busi-
ness in 2002. These are located in 118 different countries. In the
econometrics, we drop small islands from the dataset which brings
our universe of possible location choices to 88 (including France).
We also choose to restrict the sample to the 1992–2002 period be-
cause of the drastic changes in the incentives to invest in Eastern
European countries in the ﬁrst years following the fall of the Berlin
wall.
How different is foreign from domestic investment? Before
answering this question, it is useful to apply the hypotheses from
the literature to our data. Firms investing abroad are expected to
be more productive (and therefore larger in size)17 and to have a
larger share of their costs characterized by multi-plant economies
of scale (Research and Development or advertising expenditures
are typical of such costs). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics along
those lines for the whole sample of investments, as well as for each
sub-sample of domestic and foreign investments. We can see that
ﬁrms investing abroad are on average more productive and larger,18
and that their advertising ratio is higher than for purely domestic
ﬁrms (although only slightly so).
We now turn to a description of the different explanatory vari-
ables used in the empirical analysis.
3.2. ‘‘Standard” covariates
Our covariates include the standard determinants of location
choice underlined in the theoretical and empirical literature. The
most important is our measure of ﬁnal demand: the market access
(MA) of each country, which is estimated following Redding and
Venables (2004). The estimation procedure is based on a gravity
equation speciﬁed according to the theoretical NEG framework.
This estimation includes ﬁxed effects for both importers and
exporters in each cross-section of the data. The Dixit–Stiglitz–
Krugman model of trade predicts a bilateral trade equation where
the ﬁxed effect of the importing country equals lnðEjPr1j Þ. Specify-
ing trade impediments as a function of distance, regional agree-
ments, currency unions, GATT/WTO membership, colonial links
and common language, we can reconstruct a ‘‘freeness of trade”
measure /ij, and therefore MAi ¼
P
j/ijEjP
r1
j , for each potential
location country (including France). Aggregate bilateral trade data
come from the IMF’s DOTS database, and CEPII provides all of the
other gravity variables.19 This market access variable (which has a
time dimension, as most variables do) is calculated for the year of
investment.
Three additional spatial variables measuring distance from
France, common language and colonial linkages, are included to
capture the transaction costs incurred by French investors in set-
ting up a production afﬁliate abroad, TCi(f) in Section 2.1. It is likely
that a shorter distance, a common language and past colonial links
produce greater knowledge of the country by the French business
community. A natural reason for this would be that a large number
of French or former French citizens are still located there for histor-
ical reasons, making social and business networks with France
denser. Also, former colonies often retained parts of the French le-
gal system, reducing the information and legal costs needed to
start up and run a new ﬁrm there. In addition, France imposed a
substantial scheme of trade preferences for its former colonies on
the EU, making these countries attractive compared to others when
the goal is to re-export the product to France or other EU countries.
Another proposed explanation for investing abroad relates to
production costs. We proxy labour costs wi by the level of GDP16 Ideally, we would like to concentrate on greenﬁeld investments, for which the
location choice determinants seem to be more homogeneous. However our database
does not allow to do a good job at excluding all mergers and acquisitions. To limit the
number of mergers and acquisitions, we drop observations where the rise in the
number of production establishments is greater than 3 (from one year to the next).
More than 75% of all creations we observe involve only one establishment, and 20%
involve only two. Observations dropped overwhelmingly come from the French part
of the sample, they almost never occur for investments abroad. Excluding those
therefore keeps the sample more comparable between the two crucial parts of
investments we study. We however checked our results are robust to the inclusion of
these observations. Results of these estimations are available upon request.
17 Helpman et al. (2004) are among the ﬁrst to have derived this result.
18 In this table, as in all of the regressions, productivity is measured as the ratio of
value added (in current Euros) to the number of employees.
19 The method used is detailed in Redding and Venables (2004), who limit their
analysis to one year (1996), and a smaller set of countries and trade costs. We use
their preferred (third) speciﬁcation of trade costs. The Stata program used to generate
our MA, are available upon request. A complete database of market access variables
for a long period using this method is available at CEPII: http://www.cepii.fr/
anglaisgraph/bdd/marketpotentials.htm.
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per capita in the investment year,20 which we expect to enter neg-
atively once demand MAi is controlled for. The availability of high-
quality/low-price intermediate inputs in the host country is con-
trolled for by the supplier access variable described in greater detail
below.
One of the key variables in location choice has repeatedly been
shown to be the desire of investors to follow other foreign inves-
tors in the same industry. This suggests that the kind of localiza-
tion economies discussed in the urban economics literature also
affect the spatial distribution of FDI. Head et al. (1995) were the
ﬁrst to empirically detect this behavior in a conditional logit mod-
el, followed by many others. We follow the literature here and in-
clude a ‘‘sectoral network” variable aimed at capturing the extent
of spillovers between investors of the same sector. We also take
advantage of the ﬁrm-level dimension of our data to go deeper into
these agglomeration effects. Namely, we construct a ‘‘MNC net-
work” variable that measures spatial interdependence in location
choices within industrial groups. As this variable is constructed at
the ﬁrm-level, it allows us to identify separately spatial interde-
pendence in individual FDI decisions. Details on the construction
of these network variables are provided below.
Finally all regressions include continental dummy variables that
are meant to account for a possible nested structure in the choice
of foreign location. It is likely that countries inside a given conti-
nent are more comparable than countries belonging to different
continents, for instance because ﬁrms choose ﬁrst to serve each
continental zone through a production afﬁliate, and then choose
a speciﬁc country within that zone. More generally, these dummies
also account for all unobserved ﬁxed differences across large re-
gions of the world during the period under consideration. We
now describe in greater detail the more novel and complex
variables.
3.3. Supply access
In theoretical frameworks of the NEG type, a large number of lo-
cal suppliers of inputs in a host country reduces the price index of
intermediate inputs, and therefore production costs, which makes
the country more attractive (Krugman and Venables (1995) pro-
vide an early model of those interactions). Amiti and Javorcik
(2008) were among the ﬁrst to introduce a supplier access variable
taking into account the actual matrix of inter-industry linkages in
empirical location-choice analysis.
Our measure of supply access is inspired by Amiti and Javorcik
(2008). The rationale behind its construction is the following. The
incentive for a ﬁrm in sector s to locate in country i increases in
(i) country i’s supply of intermediate goods, relative to the rest of
the world, and (ii) sector s’s use of intermediate inputs. In theory,
the construction of this variable should thus use data on local sup-
pliers of intermediate goods, to measure the previous incentive (i),
as well as data on the input–output (I/O) structure of French ﬁrms’
afﬁliates abroad to assess their dependence with respect to inter-
mediate inputs (incentive (ii) above).
In constructing the variable, we however faced data availabil-
ity constraints forcing us to make additional assumptions. First, I/
O data are only available at the industry/country level, without
distinguishing domestic and foreign ﬁrms. To measure the afﬁli-
ate’s dependency with respect to intermediate inputs, we are thus
let with the choice of using information on the I/O structure of
the sector in the host country i or in France. We chose to compute
the supply access variable using French I/O data. This rests on the
assumption that foreign afﬁliates of French ﬁrms inherit their
technological organization from the headquarters. As a conse-
quence, the total share of intermediate goods in the production
of the afﬁliate is approximated by the share recorded in the
French I/O tables for sector s (called bs hereafter). The same holds
true for the technical coefﬁcients asm measuring the quantity of
industry m’s inputs needed to produce one unit of output in
industry s. Measuring each country’s supply of intermediate
goods is also complicated as it requires production data at the
industry level for a large enough cross-section of countries. As
an alternative, our measure of country i’s supply of intermediate
goods uses information on input producers in the host country
which are afﬁliates of French ﬁrms.21 Namely, the share wmi of in-
puts m produced in country i is measured by the share of the over-
all employment by French afﬁliates in industry m that is located in
country i.22 This implicitly assumes that French afﬁliates buy their
intermediate inputs from other French afﬁliates (or that the loca-
tion patterns of French afﬁliates abroad is a good proxy for the dis-
tribution of input-producing ﬁrms).
Based on those two assumptions, the availability of inputs with-
in country i that are used by an afﬁliate operating in industry s is
deﬁned as:
Supply accesssi ¼
bs
dii
Xs
m¼1
asmwmi
( )
The supplier access variable thus measures the average share of
world intermediate goods produced in country i. In the average,
each industry is weighted by the technical coefﬁcient measuring
the reliance of sector s to this particular input: afﬁliates beneﬁt
more of the proximity to local suppliers producing intermediate
goods they use intensively. The supplier access variable is also
higher if intermediate inputs are a large component of costs in
industry s (as measured by bs). Finally, the measure is divided by
the internal distance of country i, Dii, in order to account for the
ease of access to suppliers inside i. Using IO tables for each year
of the sample, we obtain time-series of sector-speciﬁc supply ac-
cess. In the estimates, the explanatory variable is supply access
in the year preceding the investment, in order to limit endogeneity
and above all not count the ﬁrm’s own investment in this variable.
Supply access is a proxy for lower prices of intermediates in the
ﬁrm’s country, and should therefore enter with a positive sign.
Fig. 1 provides an example of this variable for the automobile
sector. We plot the cumulated number of automobile investments
in different countries against the supply access of one of the lead-
ing inputs in this industry: metal production. The positive associa-
tion between the two variables is immediate.
Table 1
Individual features of investing ﬁrms.
All
investments
Foreign
investments
Investments
in France
Median productivity 232 298 225
Median employment 87 406 69
Median advertising ratio 1.0106% 1.0151% 1.0100%
Total number 16,312 2970 13,342
Note: Productivity is measured by value added over the number of ﬁrm employees.
The advertising ratio is advertising expenditures divided by ﬁrm value added.
20 GDP data (in current US dollars) and population series are taken from the World
Bank’s ‘‘World Development Indicators”.
21 We use information on all input producers, without taking into account the fact
that these foreign afﬁliates may indeed be part of the same MNC. Any ﬁnancial link
between these foreign afﬁliates will be picked up by the ‘‘MNC network” variable
described above. For a recent theoretical discussion of sourcing from afﬁliates
belonging to the same MNC, see Antràs and Helpman (2004).
22 Namely, wmi  l
m
i
lmW
, with lmi the overall employment of industry m in country i and
lmW the sectoral employment cumulated over all countries. In order to allow for some
local trade in intermediate inputs by afﬁliates, we include in lmi both French afﬁliates’
employment in i and in its immediate neighboring countries.
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3.4. Sectoral and ﬁrm-level networks
The empirical literature offers a very large amount of evidence
that FDI decisions are spatially correlated at the industry level:
investors tend to follow other foreign investors in the same indus-
try. A potential explanation for such clustering is that there are
spillovers across ﬁrms from the same industry. Urban economists
refer to these within-sector spillovers as localization economies,
as opposed to urbanization economies where positive externalities
are generated by the overall economic activity.23 Several factors
may induce localization economies, notably the classical Marshallian
externalities (sharing of inputs, labor market pooling, knowledge
spillovers) or human capital spillovers (Rosenthal and Strange,
2008). Agglomeration may also be the result of the fragmentation
of production that pushes ﬁrms producing different parts of the
same product to locate in the same area and save on trade costs
when interacting together. Devereux et al. (2007), Basile et al.
(2008) and Liu et al. (2010) are three recent examples of papers ﬁnd-
ing very strong agglomeration effects in the location choice of ﬁrms
using very comparable estimation methods.
To account for this type of localization economies, we follow the
vast literature on agglomeration effects and build a sector-speciﬁc
agglomeration variable. The ‘‘sectoral network” is calculated as the
cumulated number of French afﬁliates in the same industry located
in each potential host country in year t  1, where t is the choice
year. It is deﬁned as:
Sectoral Networksi;t1 ¼
X
u<t
X
a
Dsai;u
where Dsai;u is a dummy variable equal to one for all afﬁliates a of
sector s located in country i and created in year u or before.24
Interpretation of this type of variable can be quite broad. The
ﬁrst is to capture localization economies. While this is the most
frequent interpretation of the quasi systematically positive coefﬁ-
cients found on this variable in the literature, other channels of
inﬂuence are possible. For instance, input–output linkages, if the
diagonal of the matrix is sufﬁciently thick, as is often the case. In
our paper, the supplier access variable should control for this more
precisely, however. More generally, note that any variable omitted
from the regression and that makes a country attractive to an
industry will be captured by this industry count of ﬁrms.25 It is
therefore important to include this variable, if only to temper any
industry-speciﬁc omitted variable bias, although the interpretation
of the resulting estimate is admittedly unclear.
We also use the ﬁrm-level dimension of our data to check
whether the same type of agglomeration effects holds inside the
multinational ﬁrm. To do this we construct a ‘‘MNC network” vari-
able very much inspired by the construction of the industry-level
agglomeration variable. It accounts for the history of previous loca-
tion choices by the same industrial group. This allows us to account
for the type of spatial interdependence emphasized in Blonigen
et al. (2007) and documented in Basile et al. (2008). One possible
reason why FDI decisions might be spatially correlated is that ﬁrms
fragment their production processes to take advantage of each
country’s comparative advantage.26 Also, it could be the case that
there are economies of scale in FDI, so that having invested in a re-
gion reduces the subsequent transaction costs associated with oper-
ating in a country in the same region.
At the ﬁrm level, we are able to assess more precisely the inten-
sity of the network relationship. Not only do we know the number
of connected afﬁliates in each country, but also the detailed ﬁnan-
cial structure linking each afﬁliate to the head of the group.
Namely, we use the ﬁnancial information available for afﬁliates
from our data sources. This identiﬁes all ﬁnancial linkages between
establishments and a ‘‘head” of group, and also describes the inten-
sity of this linkage and therefore the depth of a group’s presence in
a country in a given year. Our network measure relies on a variable
called ‘‘share”, which gives the percentage ownership held by the
group in the afﬁliate. For each afﬁliate in a given country, we
sum the ‘‘share” for all afﬁliates belonging to the same group and
located in the same country:
MNC networkfi;t1 ¼
X
u<t
X
a
Dfai;u  sharefa
where Dfai;u is a dummy variable equal to one for all afﬁliates a
belonging to the French industrial group f, located in country i
and created in year u or before, and sharefa;u is the share of a’s cap-
ital owned by f at time u. This variable is thus a cumulative sum
(starting in u = 1980) of the ﬁnancial linkages for a given French
investor up to the year before the potential investment.27,28
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the network variables.
On average over the period, the mean sector in a given country re-
ceives 1.15 French investment. In the meantime, the average value
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Fig. 1. Supply access.
23 See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for an extensive survey of that literature.
24 Devereux et al. (2007), Basile et al. (2008) and Liu et al. (2010) all use a very
similar deﬁnition for their sectoral network variable. Basile et al. (2008) also add
spatial lags. They turn out insigniﬁcant in the regressions, however.
25 In particular, this variable probably accounts for the impact of other cost variables
such as land prices or institutions, sometimes used in the literature but neglected in
this paper due to data constraints. As our sample of investments abroad covers a fairly
short time span but a much larger set of host countries than usual, it is very hard to
ﬁnd consistent data for these speciﬁc cost variables. Moreover, the use of regional and
even country ﬁxed effects will control for most of those determinants since the
variance of land prices or institutions for instance should be mostly cross-sectional
over the time period under consideration.
26 See the complex-vertical FDI model in Baltagi et al. (2007). Head et al. (1995) and
Head and Mayer (2004) also produce evidence of the impact of those vertical
integration networks on agglomeration using data on Japanese multinational ﬁrms’
location choices and the inﬂuence of vertical Keiretsus.
27 Note that both measures of agglomeration effects do not account for the size of
the afﬁliate. This implicitly assumes that the localization economies are caused more
by the proximity of ﬁrms rather than that of workers. Henderson (2003) provides
empirical evidence supporting this assumption. He ﬁnds that plants do seem to
generate positive local externalities, but not workers. If we consider each plant as a
source of knowledge, this result is the sign, according to Henderson (2003), that
information spillovers are more important than labor market externalities.
28 We experimented different speciﬁcations for the MNC network variable to check
the robustness of our empirical ﬁndings. In particular, we tried using windows rather
than the same base year for the initialization of the variable (i.e. cumulated over the
last 12 years rather than starting in 1980 for all afﬁliates). We also tested a variant
that includes neighboring countries in the network of the ﬁrm. For sake of brevity, the
full robustness analysis is not included in the paper. However, it is available upon
request.
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for the MNC network variable is around 37%. At ﬁrst view, these
ﬁgures are low, suggesting agglomeration is small in our data.
However, the averages hide a strong heterogeneity, as shown by
the very large standard deviations in the second line of Table 2.
This variability is what will allow us to identify a signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcient associated with these variables in the location choice esti-
mation. One may fear the variability is in large part mechanical:
as both network variables are cumulated sums of previous invest-
ments over years, they tend to increase over time. However, the
variance decomposition provided in the bottom of Table 2 show
this is not the main source of variability in the data. Instead, the
variance in network variables mainly comes from the within
years/within countries dimension of the data. From an economet-
ric perspective, the within variability is important since most of the
covariates we already described are country-speciﬁc. Accounting
for the sectoral and the MNC network of investing ﬁrms is thus
potentially important to explain the heterogeneity of location
choices between sectors or even between ﬁrms.
3.5. Trends in the location of French-owned manufacturing
establishments
We start by describing the general pattern of French domestic
and foreign investment in our sample. Figs. 2 and 3 show the evo-
lution of the spatial distribution of investment (given by the num-
ber of new afﬁliates) among foreign countries and between France
and the rest of the world, respectively. Two trends are clear. Within
Europe, French FDI has relocated Eastwards, with a substantial fall
of the share of new afﬁliates located in Western Europe, and a rise
in Eastern European destination countries. Note that Western Eur-
ope still accounts for a major fraction of French FDI at the end of
the sample, while Europe’s share as a whole has decreased slowly,
but remains at just under 60% in 2002. The other important trend is
the rise of Asia in general, and China in particular, as French pro-
duction locations. Fig. 3 shows that while the share of domestic
investments is clearly falling, it remains remarkably high.29
Before the econometric analysis, we provide a graphical snap-
shot of some of the determinants considered below. As noted
above, the empirical literature has identiﬁed the size of the hosting
market as one of the primary determinants. Fig. 4 plots the cumu-
lated number of investments between 1980 and 2002 against our
measure of market access in the host country in 2002 (both in
logs). It also identiﬁes the countries which ofﬁcially speak French,
and the ex-French colonies. The estimated linear relationship has a
slope of .59 and a R2 of .46. In addition, most of the ex-colonies and
Francophone countries are above the regression line, suggesting
that the transaction costs of FDI are reduced by historical linkages.
Also, France is a signiﬁcant positive outlier in this graph.
One of the main points of interest in what follows is to try and
quantify more precisely the size of this ‘‘home bias” in investment
patterns, its evolution and its explanations. There are two main
explanations of the size and relative decline in the share of domes-
Table 2
Summary statistics on the network variables.
Sectoral network MNC network
Mean 1.15 37.28
Standard deviation 16.36 610.78
Variance decomposition (%)
Between years 0.1 0.05
Within years, between countries 0.1 0.05
Within years, within countries 99.8 99.9
Investments  countries 2,043,448 2,043,448
Note: The variance decomposition explains the overall variance of each network
variable by three mutually exclusive components: the variance between years, the
variance within years between countries and the variance within years within
countries. The last component thus measures the variability arising because dif-
ferent sectors in a given country-year are featured by different sectoral networks
(‘‘Sectoral Network” column) or because all afﬁliates located in the same country in
a given year do not have the same MNC network there (‘‘MNC Network” column).
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Fig. 2. Distribution of French FDI by geographical zone.
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
France Abroad
Sources : EAE (1986−2002), LiFi (1986−2002) and DGTPE (2002) datasets
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Fig. 4. French investments and market size.
29 The qualitative pattern is very similar in the sample of investments by ﬁrms with
at least one afﬁliate abroad. The share of domestic investment peaks at around 60% in
1992, before falling to 40% in 2002.
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tic investment. The ﬁrst is simple: France is a large, rich, and well-
known country to most French investors, and there might be no
bias per se in its investment share, once all location choice determi-
nants are properly controlled for. The same is true for the change in
this share. In the time period covered by our sample, France expe-
rienced a relatively low growth rate compared to other developed
or emerging economies. This with other determinants may sufﬁce
to explain the fall in the investment share in the domestic econ-
omy. Alternatively, there may be a genuine bias, emerging from
some unobserved preference of investors for their home country,
or difﬁculties in investing abroad (for instance due to a lack of
knowledge or expertise on how to do business abroad). These
biased preferences or barriers to FDI might have diminished, as
shown by the gradual increase in the proportion of non-French
shareholders in France-based multinational ﬁrms for example.
These two channels have quite different policy implications; below
we will try to quantify their relative importance.
4. Results for foreign afﬁliates
We ﬁrst present conditional logit estimation of the location
choice for French afﬁliates abroad. There are 87 possible host coun-
tries, for the 2500+ location choices that we analyze over the
1992–2002 period.
There are four different speciﬁcations in Table 3. Column (1)
present benchmark results with standard control variables. Market
access enters with the expected sign and with a size typical of that
in the literature. With variables in logs (and a large number of loca-
tion choices), the estimated coefﬁcients are close to the elasticities
of the probability of choosing a country for the average investor
(see Train, 2003). A 10% increase in market access therefore in-
creases the probability of attracting French investors by about
5%. The three transaction costs variables (distance, language and
colonial links) enter in the expected way, as does our proxy for la-
bour costs (GDP/cap) which is signiﬁcantly negative. The coefﬁ-
cient on the sectoral network is, as usually found, positive and
very signiﬁcant, and again of the same order of magnitude as other
estimates in the literature.30
Column (2) introduces supply access, while column (3) intro-
duces the ﬁrm-level network variable. Supply access always at-
tracts a signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient, which is consistent
with results in Amiti and Javorcik (2008): afﬁliates tend to be lo-
cated where it is easier to ﬁnd suppliers. Note also that the inclu-
sion of supply access reduces the inﬂuence of some of the other
variables. This applies to distance to France in particular, so that
part of the distance effect reﬂects supply-access considerations.
The same holds for the ﬁrm-level network measure, although to
a lesser extent. These networks have a strong inﬂuence on location
choice, independently of supply access. Moreover, controlling for
the MNC network does not change the signiﬁcance of the sectoral
network variable. This means that both within-sector and within-
ﬁrm agglomeration economies are at play in FDI decisions.
The comparison of different variables’ effects needs to go be-
yond elasticities (which are very similar to the coefﬁcients here),
since variables have different variances. For instance, in column
(3)’s sample, the coefﬁcient of variation (standard deviation over
the mean) is 2.533 for market access, 4.863 for supply access,
2.998 for sectoral network, and 7.479 for MNC network. Head
and Mayer (2004) propose the following thought experiment: take
a hypothetical country with the mean value of one of the variables
of interest (market access say) and redistribute market access over
countries such that the country under consideration experiences a
one standard deviation rise in MA (with the overall inclusive value
being unchanged). The ratio of the new to the baseline probability
of being chosen is ½1þ cvðMAÞb MA , with bMA being the estimated
coefﬁcient, and cv(MA) the coefﬁcient of variation of the variable
in question. This one standard deviation shock exercise produces
an increase in the ‘‘mean country’s” probability of being chosen
of 68% for market access, 19% for supply access, 84% for sectoral
network, but more than 200% for MNC networks. The large esti-
mated elasticity on this last variable combines with its substantial
heterogeneity across ﬁrms to generate a very important impact of
this type of network. Head and Mayer (Head and Mayer, 2004, Ta-
ble 3) also ﬁnd that the MNC network has a much larger effect than
the sectoral network, with similar variables and estimation strat-
egy, but a totally unrelated sample of Japanese afﬁliates in the EU.
The robustness of these results is checked via an additional
speciﬁcation introducing country ﬁxed effects. This accounts for
every characteristic of the location countries (some observable,
some not) that remain unchanged over our time period, 1992–
2002. Distance to France, common language and ex-colony vari-
ables are naturally dropped in this speciﬁcation, which identiﬁes
coefﬁcients over the time dimension only. The results are shown
in column (4) of Table 3. The largest effect here is on the coefﬁ-
cients on market access and GDP per capita, which become insig-
niﬁcant. In the short time period we consider, the variance in
both variables is clearly cross-sectional rather than time-series. It
is therefore unsurprising that they lose explanatory power when
country ﬁxed effects are introduced. On the contrary, the last vari-
ables vary greatly over time and, above all, over afﬁliates. They re-
main signiﬁcant, with coefﬁcients only little changed.31 This is
important as these are the variables that are most likely to introduce
endogeneity bias in the regression. To pick this up, we use lagged
Table 3
Conditional logit for the location of foreign investments.
Dependent variable: foreign country chosen
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln market access 0.493a 0.438a 0.412a 0.012
(.024) (.026) (.026) (.112)
Ln distance 0.440a 0.324a 0.306a
(.074) (.078) (.079)
Common language 0.035 0.225a 0.195b
(.070) (.077) (.077)
Ex-colony 0.210c 0.403a 0.411a
(.210) (.110) (.111)
Ln GDP per capita 0.341a 0.332a 0.304a 0.009
(.024) (.031) (.032) (.170)
Ln (supply access  1) 0.105a 0.097a 0.153a
(.013) (.013) (.027)
Ln (sectoral network  1) 0.616a 0.556a 0.441a 0.146a
(.043) (.043) (.044) (.042)
Ln (MNC network  1) 1.454a 1.315a
(.086) (.077)
Region ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes No
Country ﬁxed effects No No No Yes
Investments  countries 221,286 207,331 207,331 207,331
Investments 2645 2639 2639 2639
Pseudo R2 .115 .113 .127 .162
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The market access and GDP per capita variables are measured at the year of the
investment, while the sectoral network, supply access and MNC network are
evaluated the preceding year.
a,b,cSigniﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
30 The result that past investments are key predictors of future investment is
reminiscent of Wheeler and Mody (1992). Head and Mayer (2004), Devereux et al.
(2007), Basile et al. (2008) and Liu et al. (2010) conﬁrm the result in a conditional logit
context.
31 The coefﬁcient for the sectoral network is however smaller. Again, this is not
inconsistent with the ‘‘residual attractivity” interpretation of this variable, which can
represent all omitted characteristics that make a country a desirable place to invest
for most investors. If many of those unobservables are ﬁxed, the coefﬁcient will be
accordingly reduced in ﬁxed-effects estimation.
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values, but this may not be sufﬁcient if there is a great deal of per-
sistence in our variables. The country ﬁxed effects does a better
job at controlling for this endogeneity problem. The stability of the
coefﬁcients compared to those using information on past invest-
ments thus suggests that the potential endogeneity bias is not over-
whelming in columns (1)–(3).
5. Results on foreign and domestic investments
We now introduce the possibility that ﬁrms invest in their own
country, France. By doing so, we try to answer the following ques-
tion: how different is the domestic economy in the location choice
of manufacturing afﬁliates? We ﬁrst replicate the above condi-
tional logit estimation on the full set of investments, with a dum-
my for domestic investment. In a second step, we allow for speciﬁc
substitution patterns between domestic and foreign locations
using the nested logit model.
5.1. Conditional logit
The results of conditional logit estimation over the whole set of
location choices are shown in Table 4.32 Column (1) contains the
baseline estimates: all coefﬁcients are almost unchanged, except
for that on the sectoral network, which increases slightly. However,
this is not sufﬁcient to account for the substantial number of invest-
ments in France compared to other countries. The coefﬁcient on
domestic investment in Column (1) shows that the odds ratio of
investing in France rather than in a foreign country with comparable
market access, distance, GDP per capita and same number of ﬁrms in
the industry is slightly over ten. Turning to column (2), we see that
part of this ‘‘excessive” domestic investment is accounted for by sup-
ply access, but column (3) reveals that most of this gap is due to
more extensive domestic networks. The probability ratio of investing
in France rather than in a comparable foreign country in terms of
network is reduced to exp(0.95) ’ 2.6, and only 1.80 if the foreign
country is a former colony (exp(0.95  0.36)).
We therefore have a ﬁrst answer to our question concerning
domestic versus foreign investment. While the initial difference
in the number of investments might be thought to reﬂect massive
‘‘home bias” by investors, a large part can be accounted for by stan-
dard determinants of location choice. In particular, the stronger
networks of investors in their home country explain a large pro-
portion of the difference, leaving only little to be explained by
any home bias.
We consider the stability of the ‘‘French exception” by re-run-
ning the regression in column (3) of Table 4 over 3-year windows.
The results are graphically summarized by looking at the ‘‘French
exception” coefﬁcient over time. Fig. 5 presents point estimates
for each of the middle years of the windows with 5% conﬁdence
intervals. This graph reveals a relative stability of the coefﬁcient
over the regression time period (1992–2002), which suggests that
the fall in the share of manufactured investments located in France
over this period can be mostly explained by the other right-hand
side variables. Note that while the French exception coefﬁcient is
Table 4
Conditional logit for the location of domestic and foreign investment.
Dependent variable: chosen country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln market access 0.444a 0.365a 0.360a 0.333a 0.345a 0.335a 0.340a
(.023) (.025) (.025) (.029) (.030) (.026) (.029)
Ln distance 0.444a 0.261a 0.266a 0.286a 0.286a 0.237a 0.285a
(.074) (.080) (.080) (.091) (.091) (.081) (.091)
Common language 0.049 0.273a 0.222a 0.181b 0.163c 0.178b 0.174c
(.070) (.077) (.077) (.088) (.087) (.078) (.088)
Ex-colony 0.190 0.379a 0.355a 0.210 0.209 0.357a 0.207
(.109) (.112) (.113) (.129) (.128) (.115) (.129)
Ln GDP per capita 0.280a 0.272a 0.262a 0.231a 0.245a 0.236a 0.238a
(.030) (.031) (.031) (.035) (.035) (.032) (.035)
France 2.373a 2.202a 0.947a 4.071a 4.600a 7.490a 1.326a
(.069) (.073) (.084) (.300) (.165) (.424) (.094)
Ln (supply access  1) 0.141a 0.125a 0.106a 0.102a 0.120a 0.104a
(.012) (.012) (.014) (.014) (.013) (.014)
Ln (sectoral network  1) 0.884a 0.868a 0.861a 0.876a 0.824a 0.800a 0.877a
(.013) (.013) (.014) (.016) (.017) (.014) (.016)
Ln (MNC network  1) 0.750a 0.683a 0.724a 2.045a 0.678a
(.021) (.022) (.024) (.088) (.022)
France  ln productivity 0.509a
(.052)
France  ln employment 0.606a
(.025)
France  ln MNC network 1.333a
(.085)
France  ln advertising 1.556a
(.292)
Region ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investments  countries 1,266,123 1,183,772 1,183,772 1,131,094 1,138,197 1,183,772 1,136,625
Investments 14,966 14,960 14,960 14,294 14,384 14,960 14,364
French investments 12,321 12,321 12,321 12,238 12,321 12,321 12,306
Pseudo R2 0.784 0.783 0.795 0.829 0.833 0.797 0.829
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The market access and GDP per capita variables are measured at the year of the investment, while the cumulated number ofz afﬁliates in the same industry, supply access
and MNC network are evaluated the preceding year.
a,b,cSigniﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
32 Note that we chose to set the colonial and language dummies to 0 for France in
this table, which is of course just a matter of rescaling the coefﬁcients. We think that
the interpretation is more natural this way. The distance variable for France is the
internal distance, as available in the CEPII database (and described at http://
www.cepii.fr/distance/noticedist_en.pdf).
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fairly stable, this is not true of all of the coefﬁcients. One of the lat-
ter is colonial links, as illustrated in Fig. 6. Here, ex-colonies change
from being favored to being neutral over 1992–2002 (conditional
on their growth performance and other characteristics, which are
controlled for in the regression).
Our results thus suggest that a large part of the ‘‘French excep-
tion” can be explained by the determinants of location choice,
among which the ﬁrm’s network seems to be particularly relevant.
Even so, the ‘‘France” dummy remains signiﬁcant after controlling
for supply access and the ﬁrm’s network. According to Helpman
et al. (2004), home bias can be explained by the heterogeneity of
ﬁrms in terms of productivity: if there are ﬁxed costs involved with
investing abroad, only the most productive ﬁrms will carry out FDI.
This explanation of the ‘‘Export vs. FDI” arbitrage thus suggests
that the amount of domestic investment should be linked to the
distribution of productivity among ﬁrms. As a ﬁrst investigation
of this phenomenon, we interact the ‘‘France” dummy with ﬁrm-
level productivity. The results are given in column (4) of Table 4.
As expected, this interaction attracts a negative signiﬁcant coefﬁ-
cient, which means that the home bias of French investors is less
pronounced when the ﬁrm is more productive. One drawback here
is that the size of coefﬁcients in the conditional logit model with
interactions can no longer be interpreted as elasticities (Ai and
Noriton, 2003). To get an idea of the size of the productivity effect,
we have thus carried out a simulation exercise. Using the esti-
mated coefﬁcients in column (4), we ﬁrst compute the median
probability of investing abroad in the sample of 14,294 ﬁrms,
which is 3.2%. We then simulate a one standard deviation positive
shock in productivity affecting the whole distribution of ﬁrms. The
probability of investing abroad increases to 5.9% in consequence.
As a robustness check, column (5) interacts the ‘‘France” dummy
with the ﬁrm’s employment, used as proxy for its size. Again, the
interaction is signiﬁcantly negative and large: a one standard devi-
ation shock in employment increases the median probability of
investing abroad from 2.2% to 15.7% (note that the benchmark
baseline probability changes slightly across columns, since the
sample varies marginally depending on the availability of different
variables used).
In column (6), we interact the ‘‘France” dummy with MNC net-
work to ask if, beyond its impact on variable costs, this variable
also affects the ﬁxed cost of investing abroad, so that ﬁrms are
more likely to locate their afﬁliate abroad when their ﬁnancial link-
ages in destination countries are more developed. Here also, the
resulting coefﬁcient is negative and signiﬁcant. Simulations reveal
that a one standard deviation shock in this variable increases the
probability that the ﬁrm invest abroad from 3.7% to 4.9%. Last, col-
umn (7) reports results from an estimation interacting the ‘‘France”
dummy with the ratio of advertising expenditures to value added
to assess the impact of ‘‘intangible assets” on foreign investment.
The ensuing coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly negative, and simulations
suggest that a one standard deviation increase in advertising
expenditures raises the probability of investing abroad from 3.4%
to 5.9%.
The results in the last four columns of Table 4 thus suggest that
ﬁrm-speciﬁc features inﬂuence the probability that French ﬁrms
invest abroad. This results will be studied in a more structural
manner in Section 5.2, using the nested logit model. Before we
do so, we re-estimate Table 4 using a restricted sample of multi-
national ﬁrms that do invest abroad at some point in our sample.
This selection drops investments in France by ﬁrms that are purely
domestic. Another interpretation is that we now concentrate on
those investors who are productive enough to have been able to lo-
cate at least one afﬁliate abroad at some point in the last 20 years.
Those investors also sometimes choose to locate new afﬁliates in
France, in fact they do so roughly half the time in our sample,
which is now much more balanced. The results are summarized
in Table 5. Relative to the whole sample results (Table 4), the main
difference refers to the coefﬁcient on the France dummy. This is
half as large as in the full sample (compare to column (1) in Tables
4 and 5), and drops to a small, insigniﬁcant ﬁgure in column (3),
when supply access and MNC network are included in the regres-
sion. Equally, the coefﬁcients on the interacted variables in col-
umns (4)–(7) are smaller (in absolute value). These estimations
thus suggest that the ‘‘French exception” is less pronounced among
large multinational companies.
In short, the determinants of location choice, notably our ﬁrm-
level network variable, are able to explain almost entirely the dif-
ference between investments abroad and at home in this reduced
sample where only large international (i.e. more productive)
groups are analyzed. This conﬁrms the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors
in explaining the choice between investing in France or carrying
out FDI. This decision is studied in a more structural way in the
next section using the nested model.
5.2. Nested logit
We here investigate the trade-off between location at home or
abroad using a nested decision tree to model investor choice. This
method allows us to model potentially richer substitution patterns
than in the conditional logit. In the nested logit estimation, we
explicitly account for the speciﬁcity of France as a potential invest-
ment location. The simplest estimation procedure solves the
−.
5
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
C
ol
on
y 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Fig. 6. Coefﬁcient on investment in ex-colonies over time.
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Fig. 5. Coefﬁcient on domestic investment over time.
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problem backwards. We ﬁrst estimate the ‘‘bottom” model
explaining the choice of a given foreign country among the whole
set of alternatives (87 foreign countries). For this we use the same
explanatory variables as above. The inclusive value is then calcu-
lated using the obtained coefﬁcients as the sum of utilities of all
choices inside each nest (foreign countries and France). This inclu-
sive value captures the expected proﬁts for the chooser based on
the characteristics of all underlying host countries. This is then in-
cluded in the conditional logit explaining the decision to invest at
home or abroad (the ‘‘upper” model). In addition to this inclusive
value, we add other covariates that pick up ﬁrm heterogeneity in
the decision to invest abroad.
The results are presented in Table 6. For all columns, the ‘‘bot-
tom” estimation (column (1)) remains unchanged. This explains
the choice of a foreign location by the destination country’s market
access, GDP per capita, supply access, gravity variables and the net-
work variables. The results are the same as in Table 3. In the
‘‘upper” model, column (2) presents the results obtained when
only the inclusive value is introduced to explain the foreign versus
domestic investment. The estimated coefﬁcient is strongly signiﬁ-
cant and close to 0.7, meaning that the correlation between the
unobserved components of utility for alternatives within each nest
is weak compared to the correlation in errors between nests. As
noted above, the nested logit model collapses to the conditional lo-
git model when the inclusive value coefﬁcient is one. Our results
hence suggest that the substitution patterns between locations
are not radically different whether France is considered as a desti-
nation or not. This seems to point in the same direction as our pre-
vious results: once the determinants of location choice are taken
into account, conditional logit estimates suggest that the initial
large home bias is drastically reduced. The value of the inclusive
value coefﬁcient we estimate adds that the national economy is
not dramatically different from the rest of the world in terms of
substitution patterns (although the coefﬁcient being signiﬁcantly
under one indicates the relevance of the tree structure). In columns
(3)–(7), we add a ‘‘France” dummy as well as its interaction with
several ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables. As already suggested in conditional
logit estimations, the propensity to invest in France falls with ﬁrm
productivity (column (4)) and size (column (5)), as expected from
Helpman et al. (2004). Replicating the simulation exercise of Sec-
tion 5.1, a one standard deviation productivity shock affecting
the whole distribution of ﬁrms increases the probability of invest-
ing abroad from 6.3% to 11.2%. On the other hand, an equivalent
shock to the size of investing ﬁrms raises this probability from
3.8% to 33.2%. The choice between domestic and foreign invest-
ment also seems to be inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm’s network and the
size of its intangible assets (columns (5) and (6)). A one standard
deviation increase in the MNC network raises the probability of
investing in a foreign country from 3.3% to 72.7%,33 while an equiv-
alent shock to the distribution of advertisement expenditure ratios
increases it from 6.4% to 9.8%.
These results thus suggest that the determinants of domestic
and foreign investments are similar. Both reﬂect the willingness
of ﬁrms to produce at the lowest possible cost while maintaining
a large market access. Behind these country-speciﬁc determinants,
our results suggest that the main difference between investments
in France and abroad lies in the composition of ﬁrms engaging in
each type of activity. Namely, there is a sorting mechanism accord-
Table 5
Conditional logit for the location of domestic and foreign investments by MNCs.
Dependent variable: country chosen
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln market access 0.475a 0.407a 0.389a 0.370a 0.372a 0.367a 0.374a
(.023) (.025) (.025) (.029) (.029) (.026) (.029)
Ln distance 0.440a 0.295a 0.287a 0.301a 0.306a 0.266a 0.302a
(.074) (.079) (.079) (.090) (.090) (.080) (.090)
Common language 0.039 0.235a 0.195b 0.144 0.142 0.164b 0.142
(.070) (.076) (.077) (.087) (.090) (.077) (.087)
Ex-colony 0.200c 0.391a 0.364a 0.217 0.216 0.363a 0.217
(.108) (.111) (.112) (.127) (.127) (.113) (.127)
Ln GDP per capita 0.320a 0.308a 0.288a 0.266a 0.269a 0.267a 0.270a
(.030) (.031) (.031) (.035) (.035) (.032) (.035)
France 1.142a 1.008a 0.153 1.948a 1.838a 4.851a 0.549a
(.077) (.080) (.097) (.313) (.201) (.386) (.109)
Ln (supply access  1) 0.118a 0.109a 0.087a 0.087a 0.103a 0.086a
(.013) (.013) (.014) (.014) (.013) (.014)
Ln (sectoral network  1) 0.717a 0.699a 0.740a 0.746a 0.728a 0.694a 0.746a
(.016) (.016) (.017) (.018) (.018) (.016) (.018)
Ln (MNC network  1) 0.620a 0.549a 0.592a 1.491a 0.533a
(.031) (.032) (.034) (.079) (.032)
France  ln productivity 0.262a
(.054)
France  ln employment 0.235a
(.030)
France  ln MNC network 0.934a
(.075)
France  ln advertising 1.021b
(.465)
Region ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investments  countries 397,293 372,330 372,330 324,693 326,755 372,330 325,967
Investments 4694 4688 4688 4086 4112 4688 4102
French investments 2049 2049 2049 2030 2049 2049 2044
Pseudo R2 0.403 0.401 0.412 0.464 0.467 0.416 0.465
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a,b,cSigniﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
33 This result only takes into account the impact of the network variable on the
upper model, thus neglecting the effect of the shock on the inclusive value.
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ing to productivity, with more productive ﬁrms being more likely
to carry out FDI.
6. Conclusion
Using a unique dataset of individual investment decisions, this
paper analyzes the determinants of French ﬁrms’ choices of afﬁli-
ate location. The main originality of this work is that it allows us
to account for investments both at home and abroad. We are thus
able to assess whether the determinants of domestic investment
are the same as those for foreign investment. The dataset also con-
tains details on the ﬁnancial links between ﬁrms and their afﬁliates
worldwide. This allows us to measure the role of the ﬁrm’s net-
work in future investment decisions. In particular, we can estimate
the extent of agglomeration economies in the sequence of deci-
sions taken by a group when locating its different afﬁliates.
We ﬁrst concentrate on location decisions abroad. Our condi-
tional logit estimation conﬁrms several results in the empirical lit-
erature. Namely, we ﬁnd that location decisions are positively
inﬂuenced by the host country’s market and supply access, while
they are negatively linked to our proxies for labour and transac-
tion/coordination costs. Moreover, our ﬁndings provide strong sup-
port for the existence of agglomeration economies in FDI: ﬁrms are
more likely to invest in a country in which many companies of the
same industry have already invested. Beyond the within-industry
concentration of FDI however, we show location choices are also
sensitive to within-ﬁrm agglomeration economies: the probability
of investing in a given country increases with the development
of the ﬁrm’s network in that country.
In a second step, we incorporate France as a possible location in
the choice set, and ask whether the domestic economy can be con-
sidered as a potential location site just like any other country. Näıve
conditional logit estimates suggest, on the contrary, that there is a
strong ‘‘French exception” leading to a much higher probability of
investment in France than abroad for French ﬁrms. However, when
adding controls for agglomeration economies, it appears that a large
part of this ‘‘home bias” in investment decisions is accounted for by
the greater density of the ﬁrm’s network in France.
The residual premium on the domestic economy is then inves-
tigated further using the nested logit model, which allows for dif-
ferent substitution patterns between France and the rest of the
world. This third step shows that France is not that different from
the rest of the world for French investors. The main difference be-
tween investments in France and abroad lies in the nature of the
ﬁrms engaging in each type of activity. Firms investing abroad
are, on average, more productive and larger, which conﬁrms the re-
sults in Helpman et al. (2004). The ‘‘knowledge capital” model is
also consistent with the data, since ﬁrms with more intangible as-
sets are more likely to invest abroad than domestically. These re-
sults suggest that ﬁrms investing abroad pay an additional ﬁxed
cost that increases the threshold of operating proﬁt that the ﬁrm
must achieve to consider FDI as proﬁtable. This explains why only
more productive and larger ﬁrms invest abroad. However, FDI can
also be seen as a way of keeping control over the relationship with
customers, notably for ﬁrms with more intangible assets.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank INSEE and DGTPE for their generous
provision of the data. This paper has beneﬁted from very helpful
comments made by participants at the ISIT-CEPR-NBER conference
(Stockholm, 2006) and the CEPII-INSEE seminar. Detailed remarks
Table 6
Nested logit France/RoW choice.
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Dependent variable: country chosen
Ln market access 0.412a
(.026)
Ln distance 0.306a
(.079)
Common language 0.195b
(.077)
Ex-colony 0.411a
(.111)
Ln GDP per capita 0.304a
(.032)
Ln (supply access  1) 0.097a
(.013)
Ln (sectoral network  1) 0.441a
(.044)
Ln (MNC network  1) 1.454a
(.086)
Dependent variable: chosen nest
Inclusive value 0.717a 0.721a 0.680a 0.715a 2.072a 0.680a
(.009) (.014) (.015) (.018) (.035) (.015)
France 1.177a 4.013a 5.386a 14.492a 1.401a
(.029) (.268) (.133) (.314) (.033)
France  ln ﬁrm’s productivity 0.484a
(.048)
France  ln ﬁrm’s employment 0.745a
(.023)
France  ln MNC network 2.246a
(.050)
France  ln advertising 1.239a
(.281)
Observations 207,331 29,998 29,998 28,658 28,838 29,998 28,798
Pseudo R2 0.127 0.470 0.572 0.604 0.662 0.697 0.599
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a,bSigniﬁcance at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively.
T. Mayer et al. / Journal of Urban Economics 68 (2010) 115–128 127
Author's personal copy
by A. Bénassy-Quéré, M. Crozet, E. Strobl and two anonymous ref-
erees are also much appreciated.
References
Ai, C., Noriton, E.C., 2003. Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics
Letters 80 (1), 123–129.
Amiti, M., Javorcik, B., 2008. Trade costs and location of foreign ﬁrms in China.
Journal of Development Economics 85 (1–2), 129–149.
Anderson, S., De Palma, A., Thisse, J.-F., 1992. Discrete Choice Theory of Product
Differentiation. MIT Press.
Antràs, P., 2003. Firms, contracts, and trade structure. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 118 (4), 1375–1418.
Antràs, P., Helpman, E., 2004. Global Sourcing. Journal of Political Economy 112 (3),
552–580.
Baltagi, B., Egger, P., Pfaffermayr, M., 2007. Estimating models of complex FDI: are
there third-country effects? Journal of Econometrics 140 (1), 260–281.
Basile, R., Castellani, D., Zanfei, A., 2008. Location choices of multinational ﬁrms in
Europe: the role of EU cohesion policy. Journal of International Economics 74
(2), 328–340.
Blonigen, B., Davies, R., Waddell, G., Naughton, H., 2007. FDI in space: apatial
autoregressive relationships in foreign direct investment. European Economic
Review 51 (5), 1303–1325.
Brainard, L., 1997. An empirical assessment of the proximity-concentration trade-
off between multinational sales and trade. American Economic Review 87 (4),
520–544.
Brülhart, M., Sbergami, F., 2009. Agglomeration and growth: cross-country
evidence. Journal of Urban Economics 65 (1), 48–63.
Chen, M., Moore, M., 2010. Location decision of heterogeneous multinational ﬁrms.
Journal of International Economics 80 (2), 188–199.
Cingano, F., Schivardi, F., 2004. Identifying the sources of local productivity growth.
Journal of the European Economic Association 2 (4), 720–742.
Combes, P.-P., Duranton, G., Gobillon, L., 2008. Spatial wage disparities: sorting
matters! Journal of Urban Economics 63 (2), 723–742.
Coughlin, C., Terza, J., Arromdee, V., 1991. State characteristics and the location of
foreign direct investment within the United States. The Review of Economics
and Statistics 73 (4), 675–683.
Crozet, M., Mayer, T., Mucchielli, J.-L., 2004. How do ﬁrms agglomerate? A study of
FDI in France. Regional Science and Urban Economics 34 (1), 27–54.
Dean, J., Lovely, M., Wang, H., 2009. Are foreign investors attracted to weak
environmental regulations? Evaluating the evidence from China. Journal of
Development Economics 90 (1), 1–13.
Devereux, M.P., Grifﬁth, R., 1998. Taxes and the location of production: evidence
from a panel of US multinationals. Journal of Public Economics 68 (3), 335–367.
Devereux, M.P., Grifﬁth, R., Simpson, H., 2007. Firm location decisions, regional
grants and agglomeration externalities. Journal of Public Economics 91 (3–4),
413–435.
Eurobarometer, 2005. La Constitution européenne: Sondage post-référendum en
France. Flash Eurobaromètre 171, Commission Europeenne, TNS Sofres.
Guimarães, P., Figueiredo, O., Woodward, D., 2000. Agglomeration and the location
of foreign direct investment in Portugal. Journal of Urban Economics 47 (1),
115–135.
Head, K., Mayer, T., 2004. Market potential and the location of Japanese
investment in the European Union. The Review of Economics and Statistics
86 (4), 959–972.
Head, K., Ries, J., 2003. Heterogeneity and the FDI versus export decision of Japanese
manufacturers. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 17 (4),
448–467.
Head, K., Ries, J., Swenson, D., 1995. Agglomeration beneﬁts and location choice:
evidence from Japanese manufacturing investments in the United States.
Journal of International Economics 38 (3–4), 223–247.
Head, K., Ries, J., Swenson, D., 1999. Attracting foreign manufacturing: investment
promotion and agglomeration. Regional Science and Urban Economics 29 (2),
197–218.
Helpman, E., Melitz, M., Yeaple, S., 2004. Export versus FDI with heterogeneous
ﬁrms. American Economic Review 94 (1), 300–316.
Henderson, V., 2003. Marshall’s scale economies. Journal of Urban Economics 53 (1),
1–28.
Horstmann, I., Markusen, J., 1987. Licensing versus direct investment: a model of
internalization by the multinational enterprise. Canadian Journal of Economics
20 (3), 464–481.
Koenig, P., 2009. Agglomeration and the export decisions of French ﬁrms. Journal of
Urban Economics 66 (3), 186–195.
Krugman, P., Venables, A., 1995. Globalization and the inequality of nations. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (4), 857–880.
Liu, X., Lovely, M., Ondrich, J., 2010. The location decisions of foreign investors in
China: untangling the effects of wages using a control function approach. The
Review of Economics and Statistics.
Markusen, J., 2002. Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade. MIT
Press.
McFadden, D., 1978. Modelling the choice of residential location. In: Karlqvist, A.,
Lundqvist, L., Snickars, F., Weibull, J.W. (Ed.), Spatial Interaction Theory and
Residential Location, pp. 75–96.
Redding, S., Venables, A., 2004. Economic geography and international inequality.
Journal of International Economics 62 (1), 53–82.
Rosenthal, S., Strange, W., 2004. Evidence on the nature and sources of
agglomeration economies. In: Henderson, J.V., Thisse, J.F. (Eds.), Handbook of
Regional and Urban Economics, Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics,
vol. 4. Elsevier, pp. 2119–2171. Ch. 49.
Rosenthal, S., Strange, W., 2008. The attenuation of human capital spillovers. Journal
of Urban Economics 64 (2), 373–389.
Spies, J., 2010. Network and border effects: where do foreign multinationals
locate in Germany? Regional Science and Urban Economics 40 (1), 20–
32.
Strauss-Kahn, V., Vives, X., 2009. Why and where do headquarters move? Regional
Science and Urban Economics 39 (2), 168–186.
Train, K., 2003. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University
Press.
Wheeler, D., Mody, A., 1992. International investment location decisions: the case of
U.S. ﬁrms. Journal of International Economics 33 (1–2), 57–76.
128 T. Mayer et al. / Journal of Urban Economics 68 (2010) 115–128
